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SUMMARY:
... "The ability to posit mental states in other people is among the most subtly remarkable of human feats. ... Despite a
varied and sometimes confused history, the mens rea inquiry looks at a specific actor's subjective mental state at the time
of the crime. ... Psychological research, therefore, has taught us two important lessons: that mental state judgments truly
matter in criminal culpability judgments, and that understanding how people judge others' mental states is a worthwhile
and manageable endeavor. ... To test cultural differences in mens rea judgments, I conducted an analysis of variance on
mental state judgments. A "one--way" ANOVA on the culture variable revealed statistically significant cultural differences
on mental state judgments. ... By looking at the regression analysis for each mental state judgment, I could see which
other questions acted together to allow a statistically significant prediction on the mental state judgment at issue. ...
For Chinese, judgments of responsibility of the actor, another psychological measure, constituted the only significant
predictor of recklessness judgments. ... By failing to investigate how people make state of mind decisions in the legal
setting, discussion of mens rea and other mental state inquires have focused too narrowly on policy and not enough on the
psychological reality of legal standards. ...
HIGHLIGHT:
"The ability to posit mental states in other people is among the most subtly remarkable of human feats." n1

TEXT:
[*1]
INTRODUCTION
The law constantly tries to make sense of people's thoughts. Did former NBA star Jayson Williams purposely cover up
the shooting of his chauffeur? Did Texaco executives intentionally discriminate against employees based on race? Did
WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers knowingly preside over massive fraud? Each of these questions, and legal liability itself,
frequently rests upon insight into the mental states of various actors. By requiring a subjective inquiry into the human
mind in dozens of legal disciplines, the law unsurprisingly calls for an understanding of the way people think. What is
surprising, however, is that policymakers develop law related to the human mind without an understanding of the human
mind itself. Outside of the legal context, this understanding continues to evolve as psychologists pursue research on how
mental states are perceived and judged. In light of such research, particularly new studies that reveal cultural differences in
mental state judgments, legal commentators now must question not only whether existing mental state standards diverge
from true decision--making processes, but also whether such standards ignore cultural differences.
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[*2] When criminal law n2 asks whether a defendant acted intentionally, with a conscious object, or knowingly, it
asks jurors to decide what was in the defendant's mind at a certain point in time, which could have been months or even
years prior. At trial, the defendant rarely concedes that he or she intended to commit a harmful act. n3 The only way to
know with certainty what the defendant was thinking would require mind--reading access at the moment of the crime.
Because such retrospective clairvoyance is not possible, the next best thing is to have fact--finders make a determination.
So long as the defendant claims it was unintentional, however, jurors have only circumstantial evidence to rely upon.
Sometimes this evidence is strong, other times it is not. Either way, the law leaves the decision regarding a defendant's
mental state up to a panel of citizens. When such a complex inquiry becomes the lynchpin of legal liability, the law should
demand to understand whether a panel of citizens can actually apply its mental state standards. This understanding must
not just include a comparison of legal tests to the psychological reality of the cultural majority, but must also consider
whether legal standards can be fairly applied by jurors of all cultural backgrounds. These issues can be condensed into
two basic inquiries: (1) Does the law understand the way people think; and (2) Are cultural differences in the way people
think appropriately reflected in legal standards?
This Article analyzes these questions and presents the empirical results of a study I conducted to test how people judge
actors' states of mind in criminal situations. This study first investigated whether laypersons psychologically understand
others' mental states in a manner consistent with American criminal law. n4 Second, it investigated whether the perceivers'
cultural background systematically affects the way they judge others' mental states. Results of this study are analyzed
[*3] with reference to how such differences fit within the American legal framework. n5
Section I of this Article describes and critiques criminal law's subjective mens rea inquiry. It highlights a primary
theme of mens rea scholarship: that while the law heavily relies upon the truth of the inquiries, the subjective inquiries
themselves are almost impossible to prove. Section II turns to psychology to explore how the social sciences deconstruct
mental states. Psychologists have begun to reveal important links connecting psychology, intentionality and legal decision-making. Section III casts the challenge of understanding mental states into a cultural lens. After exploring research
documenting the importance of culture in decision--making, I ask whether American legal standards are unconsciously
framed in a culturally biased way. Section IV describes an empirical study I conducted to test my primary hypotheses.
First, I predicted that mens rea standards only occasionally match human psychological processes. Next, I predicted that
people from different cultures would explain criminal mental states in systematically different ways. The results generally
corroborated these predictions and provided a few unanticipated twists. Section V concludes.
I. MENS REA'S HIERARCHICAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SUBJECTIVE MENTAL STATES
By understanding the psychological basis for the way people make judgments about others' states of mind, we can begin
to improve (or challenge, if necessary) the implementation of psychologically embedded laws. n6 Scholars have not
yet fully incorporated psychological knowledge into the legal policy process, nor have they empirically examined the
psychological mechanisms involved in understanding others' minds in the legal setting.
Even without testing legal mental state standards for psychological consistency, legal commentators are well versed in
the challenges [*4] of mens rea's subjective mental state inquiries, and have perceived mens rea as "nearly impossible to
read." n7 Even the Supreme Court has noted "the variety, disparity and confusion of [judicial] definitions of the requisite
but elusive mental element." n8 Difficulty surrounds mens rea because understanding another person's state of mind
involves a difficult psychological inquiry.
Despite a varied and sometimes confused history, n9 the mens rea inquiry looks at a specific actor's subjective mental
state at the time of the crime. n10 Such a subjective inquiry magnifies the importance of psychology. Rather than asking
jurors to judge whether an actor or action was immoral or evil (as was the case historically), n11 jurors are asked to
determine what the defendant was thinking at the time of the crime. The Model Penal Code (MPC) builds on this approach
by requiring analysis of the defendant's state of mind with respect to each element of an offense. n12
Do Legal Hierarchies Match Psychological Ones?
The MPC's hierarchy of mental states sets forth an incremental, linear approach to mental states and culpability. n13
That is, for crimes with similar harms, the "higher" the mental state (i.e., the more intentional), the more severe the crime.
As some commentators have pointed out, however, successfully using the hierarchy approach to determine culpability
depends on the truth of the hierarchy. n14 There are a number of reasons why the mens rea hierarchy might not work,
even [*5] when legislative and judicial processes carefully define hierarchical mental states. Evidence suggests that
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jurors might not listen to, remember, or use instructions about the meaning of certain mental state levels. n15 Rather
than remembering the legal definition or properly applying jury instructions, however, jurors probably will rely on their
common sense understanding of others' states of mind. n16 Some scholars argue that jurors consciously or unconsciously
apply more general moral constructions in making decisions. n17 In any case (or in some combination), jurors will make
state of mind determinations based mostly upon their lay conceptions of state of mind. n18
Commentators have debated the effectiveness of the MPC hierarchy of mental states. Scholar Larry Alexander has
argued that the top three categories -- purpose, knowledge and recklessness -- do not serve distinct purposes and therefore
can all be reduced to one category: recklessness. n19 Like recklessness, he argues, purpose and knowledge exhibit the
"basic moral vice" of insufficient concern for the interests of others. n20 Joshua Dressler disagrees, arguing that "common
intuition" dictates that one mens rea category cannot possibly account for [*6] variations in criminal culpability. n21 He
states that "[a] bright line test is indefensible ... unless it produces results closely approximating those which persons, left
to their own devices, would reach on a case--by--case basis." n22 Even with this debate and Dressler's reference to lay
conceptions of mental state, no empirical studies have examined whether the legal hierarchy of mental states matches lay
mental state judgments.
II. HOW PSYCHOLOGY ALLOWS US TO UNDERSTAND MENTAL STATE JUDGMENTS
From a purely psychological perspective, it is fundamental to explore the way that people explain behavior. Such
explanations of behavior, known as "folk explanations," help guide people's understanding of each other, as well as enable
them to adapt and shape their lives accordingly. n23
Developmental psychologists were among the first to investigate folk explanations. n24 In investigating how and when
children acquire the ability to understand others' behaviors in daily life, psychologists found that children only fourteen
months old can understand interpersonal behavior in basic "intention--relevant" units. n25 At just eighteen months,
children develop the ability to infer another person's intentions. n26 While the legal relevance of these studies was not
self--evident to psychologists or legal commentators, in hindsight the methodology began to reveal how psychological
research on intentionality could eventually help to critique and improve legal knowledge of mental state judgments.
An important historical shift occurred when psychologists attempted to build a model to explain adult, rather than
child, folk intentionality. n27 [*7] In one such endeavor, psychologists Bertram Malle and Joshua Knobe theorized that
adults reference identifiable categories when judging other people's behavior. Their study indicated that perceivers refer to
five categories when judging an actor's behavior as intentional: the actor must have (1) a desire for an outcome; (2) beliefs
about a behavior leading to that outcome; (3) resulting intention to perform that behavior; (4) the skill to perform the
behavior; and (5) the awareness of fulfilling the intention while performing the behavior. n28 Malle and Knobe's article
did not specifically discuss legal implications of their findings, but the connection emerged in one of Malle's subsequent
works.
Building on Malle's prior work, Malle and Sarah Nelson explicitly argued for a psychologically competent legal
model of intentionality. n29 They argued that legal mens rea standards should be based upon mental state conceptions
consistent with human inference, instead of creating a disconnect between the existing legal framework and psychological
knowledge. n30 More specifically, they argued that Malle and Knobe's five--step system of intentionality should become
the bedrock for mens rea judgments, rather than the variety of legal standards used today. n31 Their arguments took a
big step forward by integrating psychological knowledge into mens rea scholarship. However, Malle and Nelson did not
conduct empirical research on state of mind attributions in the legal context. n32 Nor did they discuss whether jurors have
access to the detailed evidence needed to make judgments in a manner consistent with the five--step system. Yet, their
logic craftily underscores the disconnect between legal policymaking and knowledge of the human mind. In doing so,
they set the stage for empirical investigation of various standards of mental states in the legal context.
Even though no psychologists have tested how jurors actually make mens rea judgments, empirical research illustrates
the legal importance [*8] of mental state judgments in guilty verdicts. This research indicates that jurors rely heavily
on information about a defendant's mental state when making culpability judgments. Psychologists Norman Finkel and
Jennifer Groscup examined notions of criminal culpability and punishment judgments in the context of mistake of fact
and mistake of law. n33 In the study's questionnaires, Finkel and Groscup created hypothetical fact patterns that varied
actors' mental state levels and victims' harm levels in order to determine how laypersons make culpability determinations
when presented with such varying circumstances. n34 When testing the role of an actor's mental state in culpability
judgments, they consistently found that culpability determinations begin and end with notions of intentionality. n35
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By far the strongest factor in participants' culpability judgments was an actor's mental state. If, as Finkel and Groscup
suggest, intentionality is truly the beginning and end of culpability judgments, then understanding how jurors determine
defendants' mental states should be fundamentally important to criminal law.
Despite the strides taken by Finkel and Groscup's study, a key question remained unanswered: how do perceivers
make mental state judgments? After all, the prosecution and defense rarely agree upon a defendant's mental state. The
prosecution might argue that a defendant formed a specific intention to murder the victim. The defense might argue that
the killing was not at all intentional, but instead occurred negligently. Either way, the mens rea of the defendant frequently
remains unsettled and emerges as the focus of debate, with attorneys for both sides marshalling circumstantial evidence
to argue the point.
Psychological research, therefore, has taught us two important lessons: that mental state judgments truly matter
in criminal culpability judgments, and that understanding how people judge others' mental states is a worthwhile and
manageable endeavor. These two [*9] lessons merge to create a simple conclusion: testing how mens rea judgments are
made enables us to reform our laws consistent with its stated goals.
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT BEHAVIORAL ATTRIBUTIONS VARY ACROSS
CULTURES
If jurors do not make decisions in a manner consistent with mens rea tests, reformers should modify such tests to match
both policy goals and psychological reality. Similarly, if only some jurors (such as those from identifiable majority
cultural backgrounds) make decisions consistently with legal tests, such tests should be reformed to eliminate cultural
bias. This cultural issue can be broken down into two parts. The first part focuses on culture and cultural psychology n36
by exploring how culture systematically influences the way people make judgments about others' states of mind. The
second part focuses on the legal application: how should the law incorporate an understanding of cultural psychology into
the law's goals?
A. How Does Culture Influence the Way People Make Judgments?
Like legal scholarship, psychological research, including folk intentionality studies, n37 often assumes the universality
of human thought and ignores the influences of cultural differences. n38 According to psychologist Richard Nisbett and
his colleagues, "when psychologists perform experiments ... it does not normally occur to them that their data may only
apply rather locally, to people raised in a tradition of European culture." n39 However, work by cultural psychologists
indicates that sets of basic beliefs about others' minds and behavior differ [*10] across cultures. n40 Working within the
context of theory of mind and folk intentionality research, psychologist Angeline Lillard confronted cultural ignorance
by systematically reviewing the principles underlying theory of mind research, giving each a cultural perspective. n41
Though she did not empirically test her theories, she used both cultural psychological works and anthropology--based
ethnographies to support her claims. n42
Lillard summarized her theory of mind research as containing two different lines of thought. "Theory theory" proposes
that people derive ideas about others solely from available evidence. It is known as a "scientist model of people as
learners." n43 The other line of thought highlights "simulation," or the process whereby people place themselves in the
shoes of the actor. As Lillard described, simulation "enables [people] to read minds because they re--evoke the other's
mental state in themselves." n44
Under either "theory theory" or "simulation" processes, Lillard argued, the impact of culture has been ignored.
n45 "Theory theory" assumes that others do things to fulfill their desires so long as nothing is impeding them (e.g.
"he is walking toward something because he wants it"). n46 All cultures, however, do not think of mental states as
preceding behavior. For example, Samoans traditionally define an action by its effect rather than the actor's intention.
n47 Therefore, in [*11] some cultures, assumptions underlying "theory theory" might not be valid. n48 "Simulation's"
cultural insensitivity derives from the assumption that people can effectively project themselves into the role of an actor.
For members of the same culture, such a projection might not be difficult. However, perceivers from different cultures
will perceive events based on their own experiences and perspectives. When the actor and observers have different
cultural backgrounds, such a projection becomes even more difficult and may involve in--group preferences and out--group
stereotypes. n49
In a more recent work, Lillard expanded her cross--cultural explanation of theory of minds to incorporate within--
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U.S. cultural differences. n50 The new theory of minds model that she created highlighted the importance of culture in
understanding other states of mind. For example, Lillard described how urban American children tend to use internal
psychological attributions ("he helped me to catch bugs because he and I like to catch bugs") and rural American children
more frequently use situational attributions ("she helped me pick up my books, because if she didn't I would have missed
the bus"). n51
B. Empirical Studies: Culture Has a Systematic Influence on Judgments
In a related, but broader empirical effort, cultural psychologists over the past decade have discovered how perceptions,
attributions, and decision--making processes differ across cultures. n52 Even cognitive biases and the fundamental
attribution error, which legal commentators [*12] often examine as if they applied equally to all people, have been
shown to be culturally bounded. n53 Using their new knowledge about cultural differences, researchers have developed
overarching models about culture and decision--making. In particular, studies comparing Eastern and Western models of
thought have yielded fascinating results that lend themselves to historical and cultural explanations.
Some of the more theoretical work comparing East Asian and American patterns of thought focuses on reasoning
processes and contradiction. n54 For example, psychologists Peng and Nisbett examined the influence of Chinese notions
of changeability and flux compared to Western notions of linearity, formal logic, and non--contradiction. n55 They
presented participants with two potentially contradictory statements. For example, participants read statement A: "Two
mathematicians have discovered that the activities of a butterfly in Beijing, China, noticeably affect the temperature in
the San Francisco Bay Area." Participants then read statement B: "Two meteorologists have found that the activities of
a local butterfly in the San Francisco Bay Area have nothing to do with temperature changes in the same San Francisco
Bay Area." n56
When asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with the statements, after reading the second, potentially
contradictory statement, Americans agreed more with the first statement they read and less with the second statement
(compared to when they viewed the statements in isolation). n57 It did not matter which of the two statements was
presented first. Chinese, on the other hand, believed both statements more when presented with the seemingly contradictory
information of the second statement. n58 That is, Chinese not only tolerated contradiction, but also were more likely to
believe each statement when presented with potentially contradictory information. n59 Peng and Nisbett explained their
results by discussing historical and cultural notions of understanding. n60 Historically, Chinese people believed that the
world constantly fluctuated and demonstrated [*13] its interconnectedness. n61 Americans, on the other hand, relied
on principles similar to Aristotelian logic, emphasizing identity and non--contradiction. n62 In the legal setting, such
results raise the issue of how a diverse group of jurors will apply legal inquiries, and whether such inquiries may be
unintentionally culturally biased.
In a multi--cultural context, Eastern notions of a world in flux may challenge Western legal principles that attempt to
isolate certain events and specific points in time. For example, Levinson, Peng, and Wang looked at how Chinese and
Americans evaluated contractual behavior. n63 The researchers presented participants with factual scenarios containing
various contract formation behaviors, such as a correspondence between supplier and purchaser, or negotiations between
a home resident and a painter. After learning of a failure in each of the deals they read about, participants were asked
to both judge the contractual intent and responsibility of the parties and to evaluate moral shortcomings of the actors.
The results indicated that Chinese participants held more fluid conceptions of contracts than Americans. n64 That is,
because they focused on after--the--fact moral judgments in determining pre--contractual intent, Chinese perceived contract
formation as occurring at a specific point in time less frequently than Americans. n65 Many Western legal principles have
such a time--specific focus, including the mens rea determination. Mens rea asks whether the defendant had a culpable
state of mind at the time of the action. n66 Perceivers with Eastern or similar cultural perspectives may not think in such a
time--isolated manner.
Building on general studies like those described above, cultural psychologists have recently begun labeling certain
psychological principles as culture specific and investigating their operation. Some of the more interesting work has dealt
with crime, responsibility, causation, and cognitive biases, though almost all such research has focused outside the legal
context. For example, Morris and Peng studied how participants made attributions and responsibility judgments when
presented with fact patterns relating to similar mass murders in China [*14] and the U.S. n67 They found that Americans
explained murders by invoking presumed dispositions of the individual (such as the perpetrator's temperament, traits, and
disposition), whereas Chinese explained the same events with reference to contextual factors (such as bad environments
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and poor interpersonal relations). n68 A content analysis proved that media reports of the murders showed the same cross-cultural attribution patterns. n69
Morris and Peng also tested causal attributions across cultures. n70 In that study, the researchers showed participants
computer simulations of fish swimming. When asked to describe why the fish swam in various ways (e.g. swimming
towards a group or away from a group), Americans answered questions dispositionally (with regard to the individual fish)
and Chinese answered questions based upon situational factors (with regard to the group). These findings underscore a
fundamental difference illustrated by cultural psychology: members of Eastern and Western cultures view events and
behaviors quite differently.
Levinson, Peng, and Wang also conducted tests in the legal context, and found that American participants judged that
a party to a business deal intended to be bound by the deal more frequently than Chinese participants. n71 The researchers
presented participants with stories of ambiguous business deals where the principles of offer and acceptance were unclear.
They then asked participants to rank intentionality, responsibility, and other psychological and legal measures. The results
from that study showed systematic differences in evaluating intentionality judgments and should translate beyond the
contract law setting into other legal settings, including criminal law's mens rea inquiry.
Another study compared cross--cultural psychological judgments in the criminal law context. In a well--known project,
scholars Hamilton and Sanders found that Americans and Japanese made attributions of responsibility and punishment
quite differently. n72 Americans [*15] used mental state information in making responsibility judgments more often
than Japanese. n73 Japanese tended to view an actor as part of a situation more than Americans, focusing on the context
in making responsibility judgments. n74 Although they did not initially seek to test mental state judgments themselves,
Hamilton and Sanders hypothesized that perceivers based their responsibility judgments in part on mental state variation.
To that end, they created two mental state levels: "high" and "low." Participants were told either that a harm was
"accidental" (low mental state) or "done out of anger" (high mental state).
When their manipulation checks initially turned up some results that they initially could not explain, Hamilton and
Sanders compared American and Japanese mental state judgments, and found that Americans more often judged mental
states as intentional than Japanese, while Japanese respondents more often concluded that the mental state was negligent.
n75 These cultural differences resemble the findings of Levinson, Peng, and Wang n76 and lend support to the claim that
mental state attributions vary across cultures.
C. Culture within the U.S.
Cultural differences in international mental state judgments between Americans and East Asians implicate international
law standards and bear on the desirability of legal transplants. n77 Within the United States, however, the importance of
culture in mens rea judgments depends upon the existence of cognitive differences across domestic cultures. Although
cultural psychology's most influential studies thus far have examined culture on an international scale, some scholars have
researched cultural differences within the United States. These studies highlight how unique cultural communities within
the U.S. hold identifiable value systems and beliefs that deviate from majority communities. Certain American cultural
communities have been found to stress unique conceptions of time orientation, oral expression, [*16] interdependence,
conformity, harmony with nature, relationships, group welfare, and family obligations. n78 Such cultural differences
likely manifest themselves not only in value systems and behaviors, but also in cognitive patterns, including mental state
judgments. To date, however, no one has explored the implications of cultural differences within the U.S. on mental
state judgments. n79 As the domestic power of cultural differences continues to emerge, fundamental inconsistencies in
substantive law will become highlighted by such knowledge. n80
D. Incorporating Cultural Differences into the Law
As America has become more diverse, the importance of understanding culture has similarly increased. The law, in
striving to regulate, properly incentivize, and deter human behavior, should seek to understand how predictable cognitive
differences exist in different groups of people. n81 Certain concepts underlying the American legal system, developed
primarily by European Americans, may show a cognitive psychological bias toward European American cultural
constructs. While historically such biases might have impacted a smaller minority of people, in today's and tomorrow's
America the impact of having potentially culturally ignorant laws and procedures has greatened. The risk is one of bias
and discrimination. If laws are formed in a way that assumes a cultural and psychological basis of a European--American
world, then non--European Americans could get caught in a cultural gap. In a country where population predictions
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indicate a continued increase in diversity, this cultural gap could be significant. n82 Reformers must redraft laws that
contain implicit cultural biases in order to contemplate a culturally diverse country.
[*17] In the current context, we must ask whether different cultural groups apply mens rea inquiries in systematically
different ways. If we learn that differences exist, we must investigate the origins of those differences. How many of
the differences are solely due to the role of diversity in decision--making (a desired result), and how many are due to
ethnocentric legal standards (an undesired result)? For example, if asking jurors to consider whether a defendant "intended
to kill" evokes predictably divergent reasoning processes and responses across cultures, we must investigate whether the
standard unnecessarily frames or limits the culturally broad cognitive processes that should exist in the jury system. Can
a diverse jury conduct an appropriate inquiry in the face of legal standards that contain embedded cultural assumptions?
IV. EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF MENS REA IN A CULTURAL CONTEXT
I devised a study designed to investigate how people determine mental states and how such judgments vary across
cultures. In particular, I examined how perceivers make mental state judgments when presented with specific mens rea
inquiries. I also tested these judgment processes across cultures (in the U.S. and China) and investigated how cultural
differences emerged in mens rea decision--making.
A. Hypotheses:
I proposed that each mens rea inquiry carries with it a unique set of lay psychological assumptions that impact the
decision--making process. I further proposed that legal assumptions relating both to the quality and hierarchy of mens rea
judgments would only sometimes corroborate with psychological results. In addition, I predicted that cultural differences
in mental state judgments would emerge in a systematic fashion. Following existing research that highlights Westerners'
focus on an individual's disposition when attributing blame, I predicted that Americans would make higher mental state
judgments than Chinese. That is, compared to Chinese perceivers, Americans would perceive actors as having acted more
intentionally and with more knowledge.
[*18]
B. Methods and Materials:
I recruited participants in the United States and China. Undergraduate students at Beijing University participated in the
study for pay. UC Berkeley undergraduate students taking part in a psychology course participated in the study. n83
Harvard University students who were in a student--commons area participated for the chance to win a gift certificate. n84
I used a multiple variable design in the study. n85 Participants received one of four forms of a questionnaire. n86 I
originally drafted the research materials in English with consideration for cross--cultural understanding of the concepts.
Separate bi--lingual translators converted the survey into Chinese and then back into English. The agreement between
translators was high. Consulting with appropriate authorities, I resolved the few discrepancies that emerged.
The scenarios presented to participants provided stories of harms that omitted direct reference to an actor's mental
state. That is, participants could only infer an actor's mental state from circumstantial facts. n87 I asked participants to
complete a questionnaire that included four fact pattern vignettes. Each vignette presented facts in which a person was
injured by a state of mind ambiguous actor. For example, participants read about a woman who saw her boyfriend kissing
another woman. After seeing the kiss, the woman ran out of the building crying. Her boyfriend ran after her to her car.
While he stood behind her car, the crying woman started the car and accelerated quickly backward, striking her boyfriend
with the car. n88
[*19] Prior to moving on to dependent variable measures, some of the participants were asked to complete four guilt
questions. n89
C. Measures
The dependent variables focused on state of mind attributions. Some variables tested included:

1) Common Law--Intent (kill) n90
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2) Common Law--Intent (hurt)
3) Common Law--Extreme Recklessness (kill)
4) MPC/Common Law--Recklessness (hurt)
5) MPC--Purpose (kill)
6) MPC--Purpose (hurt)
7) MPC--Knowledge (hurt)

As indicated in the above list, I presented participants with various mental state judgments that are similar to legal
judgments, both common law and Model Penal Code (MPC). Questions 1 and 2 tested the common law intentionality
judgment by asking about the actor's intent to kill and intent to hurt. In the murder or attempted murder context, an
intent to kill can constitute the "malice aforethought" required by common law. n91 Question 3, which I refer to as the
"extreme recklessness" question, asked about an extremely reckless disregard for the value of human life, another mental
state that can qualify an accused for common law murder. n92 Question 4 tested the MPC and common law concept of
"recklessness," which is met when an actor "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustified risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct." n93 Questions 5 [*20] and 6 tested the MPC standard of "purpose,"
which denotes a "conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result." n94 Legal commentators
treat this inquiry as analogous to the common law intent inquiry. Question 7 tested the MPC concept of "knowledge,"
which is met when an actor is "aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result." n95
D. Results
1. The MPC Mental State Hierarchy. I first examined mental state judgments in the context of testing the MPC's mens
rea hierarchy. Examining aggregate mean responses indicated that the hierarchy of mental states provides meaningful
distinctions between levels of mental states. For MPC based questions that asked about mental states relating to hurting the
victim, significant variance emerged in the MPC--anticipated order between American judgments of purpose (m=4.11), n96
knowledge (m=4.24), and recklessness (m=4.42). These mean scores generally demonstrate that participants maintained
a folk mental state hierarchy: purpose above knowledge above recklessness. As confirmed by a "paired samples T-test," the differences between purpose and recklessness responses, as well as between purpose and knowledge responses,
were statistically significant (p<.01 and p<.05, respectively). n97 The differences between knowledge and recklessness
responses were only marginally statistically significant (p<.07). These results generally, though not perfectly, support a
theory that meaningful differences exist in MPC hierarchy levels. n98
[*21] However, because the MPC hierarchy results presented above aggregated all four fact patterns that the
participants scored, the results do not mean that the mens rea hierarchy worked in each individual case. In order to test the
possibility that the hierarchy worked only in some cases, I computed means for each fact pattern and ran a series of paired
sample t--tests on American responses. Examining mean responses separately in each of the four cases suggested that the
hierarchy only held true once. That is, for the same three supposedly hierarchical MPC variables that I discussed above
(purpose, knowledge, and recklessness), the hierarchy held true only in one of four fact patterns. In two of the four cases,
multiple paired sample t--tests indicated that none of the MPC mental state categories significantly differed from each
other. In the other fact pattern, participants scored both knowledge and purpose as higher than recklessness (of marginal
significance). But results did not indicate a significant difference between purpose and knowledge scores.
Table 1. American Judgments of MPC Mental States (by Case)

Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4

Purpose
4.04
4.35.
5.01
3.06*

Knowledge
3.90
4.27*
5.02
3.77*

Reckless
3.97
4.64*
4.91
4.17*
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* indicates statistical significance
level of p<.05 comparing marked
variables within the case.
. indicates marginal
statistical significance level of
p=.07 comparing marked variables
within the case.
2. Mental States Generally. Beyond examining the truth of the MPC hierarchy, other aggregate mean results indicated
that certain mens rea responses emerged in unanticipated ways. For example, the supposedly analogous concepts of intent
and purpose did not reveal analogous results. A paired samples T--test revealed that purpose judgments were viewed as
being a more serious (higher) mental state than intent judgments. These results emerged for both Americans and Chinese,
and for judgments relating to both hurting and killing the victims (in each case, p<.01).
Beyond a basic examination of means, in order to further examine the relationship among all mental state judgments,
I ran Pearson correlations to evaluate aggregate indices of the state of mind [*22] scores. For American participants, all
mental state indices significantly correlated with each other, in each case p< .001. Similarly, for Chinese, almost all mental
state indices significantly correlated with each other (ranging from p< .001 to p< .05). n99 These results, which showed
almost universal mental state correlations, are not surprising and indicate that mental state judgments are at least related
to one another. As I discuss later, I further examined the relationship of these correlations through a linear regression
analysis.
3. Cultural Differences. To test cultural differences in mens rea judgments, I conducted an analysis of variance on
mental state judgments. A "one--way" ANOVA n100 on the culture variable revealed statistically significant cultural
differences on mental state judgments. As demonstrated in Table 2, infra, Chinese consistently made higher state of mind
judgments than Americans, including judgments of extreme recklessness, intent to kill, purpose to kill, knowledge, and
deliberation.
To test cultural differences in mock--jury guilty verdicts, I ran a series of chi--square analyses. These analyses revealed
that Chinese were statistically more likely than Americans to convict mock--defendants for attempted murder on some of
the criminal fact patterns, n101 and for assault and battery on all fact patterns. n102 In addition, Chinese scored defendants
as more guilty than Americans on guilty scale (0--100) judgments for both attempted murder and assault and battery.
Table 2 Mean and Standard Deviation of Indices by Culture (ANOVA)

Chinese
Indices
Mean
Intent to Kill
3.25
Intent to Hurt
4.61
Extreme Recklessness
4.93
Reckless
4.27
Purpose to Hurt
4.36
Purpose to Kill
3.11
Knowledge
4.74
Deliberate
3.71
Premeditate
4.05
Att. Murder (0--100)
51.08
Ass. & Batt. (0--100)
77.37
Significance Values (Indicating Significant
Differences Across Cultures)
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001

SD
.82
1.10
1.06
1.05
1.09
.82
1.03
.85
1.03
12.06
15.63

American
Mean
2.98
4.36
4.11
4.42
4.11
2.84
4.24
2.92
3.94
44.26
59.55

SD
.97
1.16
1.30
1.22
1.17
.96
1.11
.99
1.13
18.33
16.53

F
5.15*
2.73
26.00***
1.01
2.78
5.37*
12.48***
42.79***
.599
5.13*
34.82***
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4. Analyzing the Process of Mens Rea Judgments. Next, in order to investigate participants' state of mind determinations
further, I ran a series of multiple linear regression analyses (split by country) on each of the state of mind questions. These
tests were designed so that results would indicate the predictor variables for each state of mind measure. That is, they
would allow me to understand what other evaluation judgments were used by participants when making particular mental
state judgments. In addition to the nine mental state judgments that participants answered, they also responded to several
psychological [*23] measures. These measures included questions relating to the morality and character of the actor, the
actor's deservingness of punishment, and the victim's right to compensation, among others. By looking at the regression
analysis for each mental state judgment, I could see which other questions acted together to allow a statistically significant
prediction on the mental state judgment at issue. n103 That is, I could determine which questions, acting together, allow
for a prediction of a given mental state inquiry.
Results of a regression analysis on intent to kill judgments for American participants indicated several variables that
were statistically significant in predicting them, including purpose judgments, knowledge judgments, and a psychological
measure of "bad person" judgments, a measure that was designed to test the role of an actor's character in perceivers'
decision--making. By contrast, the regression [*24] on Chinese intent to kill judgments suggested two significant
predictors: purpose to kill judgments and premeditation judgments. The significance of the "bad person" predictor in
American judgments indicates that intent to kill judgments relied in part on determinations of an actor's character. For
Chinese participants, predictors encompassed only other state of mind variables.
For knowledge judgments, regression results suggested that American participants were more likely to believe that the
defendant acted with knowledge when they judged the action as immoral. Such a result once again raises the question of
the degree to which judgments of an actor's moral character affect mental state judgments. In addition, the psychological
measures of severity of punishment deserved, how guilty the actor should feel, the responsibility of the victim for what
happened, and bad person judgments all served as predictors for knowledge judgments. Thus, psychological factors
played a large role in judgments of an actor's knowledge. The mental state judgments of intent to kill and purpose to hurt
also served as predictors of knowledge judgments. For Chinese, intent to hurt and deliberation judgments were the only
significant predictors of knowledge judgments. Thus, Chinese mental state judgments were predicted once again only by
other mental state judgments. n104
In contrast to results on the intent to kill and knowledge variables, regression analysis on American recklessness
judgments indicated that other mental state judgments acted as the sole predictors, with no psychological measures
acting as predictors. Intent to hurt and extreme recklessness judgments served as significant predictors of recklessness
judgments. For Chinese, judgments of responsibility of the actor, another psychological measure, constituted the only
significant predictor of recklessness judgments.
5. Relationship between Guilty Judgments and Mens Rea. I also tested the relationship between guilty judgments
and mens rea judgments. More specifically, I tested the predictor variables in guilty scale judgments. A series of linear
regression analyses on attempted murder scale judgments illuminates the process by which participants made guilt
determinations. Analysis on American attempted murder verdicts indicated two significant predictors of guilt: intent to
kill and extreme recklessness. The premeditation variable was a marginally [*25] significant predictor. These results
appear to corroborate Finkel and Groscup's findings that culpability "begins and ends" with intentionality. Yet, only
selected mental states predicted guilt. Further research must investigate the role of other mental state judgments in guilty
verdicts. For Chinese responses, the regression revealed no individually significant predictors of guilt for attempted
murder, and only punishment as a marginal predictor.
Results of a linear regression analysis on assault and battery guilty scale judgments indicated three significant predictor
variables for Americans: extreme recklessness, deliberation, and monetary relief. n105 In contrast with the results for
attempted murder, intent judgments were not significant predictors of guilty scale judgments of assault and battery.
Instead, other mental state judgments predicted guilt. For Chinese responses, the regression suggested two significant
predictors: intent to hurt and punishment. Extreme recklessness was a marginally significant predictor for Chinese
responses.
Finally, I examined the relationship between guilty verdict judgments and guilty scale judgments. In particular, I
calculated the mean responses on the guilty scale for guilty and non--guilty judgments. Such a calculation was intended
to shed light on the question of how guilty do jurors think defendants have to be before finding them guilty. Results
indicated that, on average, Americans who judged defendants guilty scored the defendant guilty 82.11 out of a possible
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100. Chinese scored the defendant guilty 78.61 out of a possible 100 (recall that 0 stood for "definitely not guilty" and 100
stood for "definitely guilty"). For not--guilty judgments, Americans scored their average not--guilty defendant as 25.91 out
of 100, while Chinese scored their average not guilty defendant as 27.43 out of 100.
E. Discussion of Results
The MPC mens rea hierarchy assumes that mental states function incrementally. Yet results indicated that, while the
hierarchy generally succeeded when all fact pattern results were combined for statistical analysis, the hierarchy was not
psychologically accurate in three out of four individual fact patterns. Legal commentators must ask themselves whether
these results are sufficient. If the goal of the hierarchy is to provide a framework that loosely represents American
cognitive understanding of mental states, it likely succeeds. Yet if the [*26] goal is to provide a legal structure that
embraces a true model of thought, the hierarchy likely fails.
Looking beyond the hierarchy, people decided supposedly similar questions in different ways and decided supposedly
different questions in similar ways. The vacillation in predictor variables from question to question indicated that subtle
differences in mental state inquiries had a more than subtle impact on decision--making processes. Some of these predictor
variables, such as "bad person" judgments and immorality judgments, n106 raise the question of whether irrelevant
personality traits or situational factors (such as the defendant's race) might lead to harsher mental state judgments through
the workings of unconscious biases.
The results also demonstrate the importance of understanding culture in legal decision--making analysis. As predicted,
cultural differences persisted throughout state of mind attributions as well as in guilty judgments. Both mean scores, as
well as regression analyses, indicated that Chinese make mental state judgments in different ways than Americans. n107
These culture--based results lead to two conclusions. First, cultural differences influence both state of mind processes
and decisions. n108 Although results in the present experiment compared two different nations (clearly relevant in
international law), n109 [*27] domestic law should also display sensitivity to cultural variances. Future research should
seek to investigate whether and how cultural background within the U.S. impacts state of mind determinations. Legal
standards should not just work properly for a certain subset of a population.
Because there is no true way to evaluate whether mens rea judgments are being made "correctly" by one cultural group
or another, we must learn more about the cultural assumptions embedded in certain legal inquiries. We know that culture
influences mental state judgments. Now we must investigate how cultural differences are impacted by variations within
and across legal inquiries. To do so requires taking a critical look at our inquiries to ensure that they accommodate cultural
variation while accurately effectuating policy goals. A European American psychological point of view, embodied in
a mental state inquiry, is not conducive to achieving a just legal system. The correct view preserves policy goals while
respecting cultural differences.
Before jumping to conclusions about the inefficacy of legal mental state inquiries, these results warrant a caution. True
jury trials do not present over half a dozen mental states at once. Instead, they rely on the charge and the formulation in
that jurisdiction. The state of mind judgments and predictor variables I tested thus do not directly imitate the legal process.
Future research should be conducted in more realistic legal situations, where fewer mental state terms are presented in
any one situation.
The results of the regression analysis on scaled guilty judgments indicated that, as prior research has revealed
generally, culpability does in fact start with mental state judgments for Americans. Not all mental state judgments tested
were significant predictors of guilt, [*28] however. For attempted murder judgments, knowledge, deliberation, and
purpose judgments did not generate a significant predictive effect on guilt. For assault and battery judgments, intent,
purpose, and knowledge judgments similarly failed to predict guilt. These findings indicate that the variety of mental
states in American jurisprudence do not equally impact guilt determinations.
V. CONCLUSION: BRIDGING PSYCHOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND LEGAL POLICY
The proliferation of legal standards based on policy considerations has created a gap between legal standards and human
decision--making processes, particularly when it comes to understanding how humans perceive others' mental states. By
failing to investigate how people make state of mind decisions in the legal setting, discussion of mens rea and other
mental state inquires have focused too narrowly on policy and not enough on the psychological reality of legal standards.
Empirically investigating the relationship between law and human cognitions is the first step in solving the problem.
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The legal community must embrace cultural psychology's empirical contribution. The consistent development of
psychological theory demands investigation in the legal realm, driven by cross--cultural studies indicating that cultural
systems of thought continuously evoke systematically different results. The systematic nature of these results, and the
results I presented, calls for understanding and application. The law must heed these calls. When diversity of background
contributes directly to diversity of thought, the law cannot blindly assume that its substantive standards present culturally
neutral instruments of implementation. The law's instruments must be examined, honed, and tuned. They must evolve
into culturally sensitive pieces that allow for the workings of diversity within a neutral, understanding, and culturally
cognizant legal structure.
In this Paper, I have attempted to challenge the existing legal understanding of the human mind with new knowledge of
the human mind itself. In criminal law and so many other contexts, the law hinges judgment on an assumption that we can
evaluate a person by something that cannot be seen or touched, but something mental. In this way, the law recognizes part
of the essence of humanity. Psychology has blessed us with both an emerging knowledge of this piece of humanity and
the cultural caution that its truths are not universal. Instead, [*29] its truths are vibrant, diverse, and ripe for discovery.
The law has embedded psychology. Perhaps psychology can help provide greater meaning to the law.
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In addition to asking participants whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty, participants were asked to rate
"how guilty" the defendant was (on a scale of 1--100). I call these scaled questions "guilty scale" questions. Because
of procedural differences in the legal systems, Chinese participants were told to answer questions in their role as a
judge, and American participants were told to answer questions in their role of a juror.

n90. The category in parentheses indicates whether the mental state referred to killing the victim or hurting the
victim in order to differentiate between attempted murder and assault and battery.

n91. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 467 (2d ed. 1995).

n92. Id. at 503.

n93. Model Penal Code 2.02(2)(c) (1985). I tested conceptions of recklessness without the justification element,
which imports a separate (and unrelated to subjective mental state) notion into the state of mind analysis.

n94. Model Penal Code 2.02(2)(a)(i) (1985).

n95. Model Penal Code 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (1985). There were two additional mental state questions that I did not
highlight in the summary list of mental state questions. Questions 8 and 9 also addressed issues that can be relevant
to malice aforethought judgments, particularly in jurisdictions where degrees of murder are used. Many state
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jurisdictions require that first--degree murder include "willful, premeditated, deliberate" action. Dressler, supra
note 91, at 469--70. In many contexts, willful is defined as analogous to intent, embodied in Questions 1 and 2.
Premeditation asks whether the defendant thought about acting beforehand or whether the action was committed
impulsively. The inquiry into the nature of "deliberate" action asks whether the actor considered the effects and
consequences before acting. Question 8 tested deliberation, and Question 9 tested premeditation.

n96. The "m" stands for mean score.

n97. The "p" value refers to statistically significant levels. Psychologists generally agree that statistical
significance of a test is indicated if the p value is less than .05. A p value between .05 and .07 indicates marginal
significance of a test.

n98. Chinese participants did not follow the same hierarchy. Chinese responses indicated that participants
considered knowledge as the lowest mental state level, below purpose and recklessness.

n99. Only Chinese extreme recklessness and deliberation judgments were not significantly correlated with each
other.

n100. A "one--way" test means that only one variable was isolated in testing variance. In this instance, I
compared the results across the culture variable, comparing Americans with Chinese. An ANOVA is a statistical
test of analysis of variance.

n101. Chinese were more likely than Americans to convict for attempted murder for fact patterns 3 and 4.

n102. Chinese were more likely to convict for assault and battery for all fact patterns, except that results were
only marginally significant for fact pattern one.

n103. Because I tested so many mens rea judgments together (more than a jury would consider at any one trial),
my results do not match actual trial reasoning processes. For example, depending on the jurisdiction and charges,
jurors asked about recklessness might not also be asked about intent and extreme recklessness. Therefore, processes
will vary based on the "package" of inquiries in the particular jurisdiction. In addition, though I tested the role of
psychological factors in mental state judgments, such judgments are not an explicit part of the legal inquiry. While
these variables must be examined for their role in mental state judgments, the variables I presented in this respect
also do not match a true trial.

n104. For other variables, however, such as the purpose to kill variable, state of mind variables actually served
as negative predictors for Chinese. In that case, the premeditate factor served as a negative predictor of purpose to
kill.
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n105. These judgments asked whether or not an injured party should financially recover.

n106. Results indicating the seemingly heavy reliance by Americans, rather than Chinese, on morality of action
judgments in state of mind attributions are surprising. Previous psychological research led me to predict that
Chinese would generally focus more on notions of morality than Americans would.

n107. In almost all judgments, Chinese participants made higher state of mind attributions than American
participants. Such mental state judgments went in the opposite direction from my prediction. One possible
explanation for this trend is a stronger penal consciousness in China. Some Chinese historians have suggested that
China's legal history was penal in nature. William P. Alford, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual
Property Law in Chinese Civilization 10 (1995), citing Derk Bodde & Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China
(1973), which characterized Chinese law as "overwhelmingly penal in emphasis." Alford disagreed with Bodde
and Morris' penal approach to Chinese law, instead emphasizing broader social principles. The type of contextual
explanation offered by Bodde and Morris can help distinguish higher Chinese mental state attributions in the
criminal context from lower attributions relative to Americans found by researchers in other contexts. See Levinson
et al., supra note 4.

n108. Despite the steps I took to safeguard against language differences, I cannot entirely rule out the complexity
of language or cultural--specific meanings as factors in various judgments and related processes. Yet, at least in the
international law context, language gaps are real. Standards should be sought that can overcome both cultural gaps
as well as language gaps.

n109. I would like to briefly mention the Chinese law implications of the results of Chinese participants. The
regression results on Chinese participants' attempted murder guilty scale judgments, which indicated that Chinese
mental state judgments did not predict guilt, raises some issues regarding the Chinese legal system's reliance on
Western--like criminal laws in determining guilt. While the Chinese do not have laypersons as jurors, they do
rely on judges' ability to link guilt determinations to mental states. If Chinese cultural and psychological norms
do not underlie such imported legal notions, then their legal ideals will not be effectuated. The Chinese reliance
on punishment as a predictor of guilt determinations (a marginally significant predictor) indicates that perhaps
scholars' arguments that Chinese history has lead to a more penal emphasis rings true. See Alford, supra note
107, at 10. In fact, such a contention would be consistent with other results I have reported here, indicating that
Chinese were more likely than Americans to find defendants guilty and make higher mental state attributions. The
results of the regression on assault and battery, unlike the results on attempted murder, tended to indicate that
Chinese do in fact look to mental states when determining guilt. In addition to the predictor of punishment (which
was present marginally in attempted murder judgments), the variables of intent to hurt and extreme recklessness
played roles in predicting guilt determinations. These findings raise hope that the mental--state based culpability
standards of Chinese law are consistent with Chinese cultural norms. Yet further research is needed on Chinese
lay understandings of criminal guilt to determine whether policy reform would be best suited to psychological
constructs of Chinese citizens.

